New governance, new dilemmas: post-reform issues in New Zealand’s public sector by Norman, Richard
V
ol
um
e 
2,
 N
um
be
r 
3 
20
06
24
Introduction
During fast-paced reforms of the 1980s and 1990s 
in New Zealand, the emphasis was on ‘problem 
solving’ to create a new system of governance. With 
‘new governance’ structures in place for nearly 20 
years, a major management role is that of reconciling 
dilemmas arising from prescriptions for reform. The art 
of managing dilemmas – the balancing of competing 
propositions – is described in this article. Eight dilemmas 
are identifi ed to encapsulate the tensions that are evident 
in a model which gives managers considerable delegated 
authority for fi nance and people, while holding them 
accountable for results.
New governance, new dilemmas
As an early and comprehensive adopter of theories 
described as New Public Management (NPM) or 
‘reinventing government’, New Zealand now has 20 
years experience of what Salamon (2002) terms ‘new 
governance’. This term helps distinguish between 
advocacy for reform which was a feature of the late 1980s 
and much of the 1990s, and the new systems of public 
management created as a result of reform. While before 
1984 ‘old public administration’ was delivered through 
centralised bureaucracies with distinctive employment 
and accounting rules, new governance involves the use 
a ‘dizzying array’ of tools for delivering government 
objectives.
The essence of new governance is the use of private 
sector-style techniques and instruments that seek to 
encourage and cajole performance. In place of steep 
public sector hierarchies are networks and contracts 
for performance with a variety of public, private and 
non-profi t agencies. Where the task of management 
previously meant command and control within self-
contained bureaucracies, a significant element of 
the work now requires negotiating, persuading and 
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enabling the delivery of services through contracts and 
partnerships (Salamon, 2002, p.9). 
The skills required for such work are significantly 
different from those required for past, rule-based 
systems of bureaucracy or the entrepreneurial freedoms 
of the private sector from which many new governance 
techniques have been drawn. Ironically, perhaps, clear 
prescriptions for reform have created a performance 
system which contains a series of paradoxes, the 
‘simultaneous presence of contradictory, even mutually 
exclusive elements’ (Cameron and Quinn, 1988, p.2; 
Norman, 2003).
Paradoxes include: 
• Freedom to manage gives managers freedom over 
resources, but has also increased the desire of 
politicians to scrutinise this freedom and rein it in 
(Maor, 1999).
• Clear objectives and targets for performance can 
sharpen the focus of public agencies, but can also 
distort results when clear goals displace longer term 
and less measurable outcomes (Blau, 1963). 
• Quality information is needed to ensure that 
managers can be held accountable. However, 
accountability agencies are constantly open to the 
temptation to increase the information they require, 
particularly if they don’t directly pay for its gathering 
(Feldman and March, 1981). Increased quantities of 
information can be at the expense of its quality. 
• Accountability for results, which is intended to 
improve performance, can pressure managers so that 
they opt to volunteer only safe, easily achievable (and 
sometimes trivial) objectives that minimise the risk 
of political embarrassment (Thomas, 1998). 
The performance framework that resulted from NPM 
creates a series of contrasting propositions which present 
themselves as dilemmas, or polarities to be managed, 
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mapped, navigated and reconciled (Johnson, 1996; 
Hampden-Turner, 1990). 
Dilemmas are inherent in public sector roles. Many 
issues in ‘the public domain’ typically do not have 
simple solutions. With the privatising of the most easily 
marketised services during the 1980s and 1990s, this is 
even more the case for the remaining publicly-owned 
activities. Public services often involve dilemmas because 
decision makers must ‘weigh the balance of benefi t and 
disadvantage for the well-being of the many and of all’ 
(Ranson and Stewart, 1994, p.90). Whereas private 
sector organisations can solve dilemmas by writing them 
out of their area of organisational concern and focus on 
the bottom line, public organisations must reconcile 
the values and interests of a range of competing claims. 
One of these is the confl ict between citizens’ interests as 
clients and the interests of citizens as taxpayers, which 
means that ‘street level bureaucrats’, those in charge of 
day-to-day client service, must make constant rationing 
decisions in the face of potentially unlimited demand 
and fi xed budgets (Lipsky, 1980).
Recurring dilemmas for New Zealand public 
managers 
The following eight dilemmas, which have been distilled 
from earlier research (Norman, 2003), illustrate tensions 
experienced by managers working with a complex ‘new 
governance’ system, created in New Zealand since 1984. 
The fi rst four dilemmas take an inwards focus on the 
‘how’ and ‘who’ of government, while the second four 
focus on ‘what’ government organisations are expected 
to deliver.
The how and who of government
Partners or arms-length deliverers? 
With approximately 40% of the New Zealand budget 
being delivered through ‘third party’ agencies rather 
than ministerially-controlled departments or ministries, 
the dilemmas of steering for results are a central feature 
of the system.1 Staff of ministries and departments 
in charge of managing the funding of third parties, 
predominantly publicly-owned agencies, but also private 
and non-profi t organisations, need to steer for results 
while also guarding against politically embarrassing 
risk, without stifl ing the innovation, fl exibility and 
savings that such sub-contract systems are intended 
to encourage. How do people in these roles reconcile 
the dilemmas of centralised direction and localised 
autonomy? How can they steer without stifl ing? 
Performance or capability? 
Public sector reforms have sought to shift ‘entitlement 
focused’ organisational cultures towards performance. 
Effi ciency, effectiveness and outputs have been the 
language of performance. The overall theme has been 
one of managing for results within specified time 
periods. Yet for many public services, such as defence, 
emergency services and biosecurity, capability building 
and being prepared is the major part of performance. 
For professional groups in the health, education and 
welfare sectors, which constitute the largest proportion 
of government budgeting, capability is directly linked 
with performance. Too much focus on performance can 
reduce the opportunity to invest in capability building, 
while too much focus on capability can result in a ‘gold 
plating’ of public sector roles. 
Focus or collaboration 
Organisation structures need to accomplish both focus 
and collaboration, but achieving such balance is the 
core dilemma of organisation design. Functionally 
organised and focused services are frequently expected 
to collaborate in the delivery of services to particular 
communities to avoid local confusion. Whether the term 
is ‘joined-up government’ (Britain) or ‘strengthening 
the centre’ (New Zealand), the dilemma is how to 
create goal-driven, focused organisations which also 
collaborate effectively. For central agencies in particular, 
the challenge is similar to the dilemmas faced by 
managers of third-party deliverers: how to steer for 
collaboration without stifl ing the initiatives that can 
come from organisational focus. 
Central control or autonomy of decision making in 
fi nancial management
Central agencies within government face a dilemma 
similar to that faced by contractors in charge of third-
party delivery. There is an absolute need to safeguard 
taxpayers’ funds, but also the need to encourage those 
1 For the 2005-06 fi nancial year, non-departmental and other spending 
was $NZ23.5 billion, compared with $9.4 billion of departmental 
spending. Non-departmental spending was nearly 40% of total 
spending of $57.5 billion, with health and education agencies 
receiving the bulk of the funds. Other major items were benefi ts ($16 
billion), borrowing costs ($2.6 billion) and capital ($5.5 billion). 
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closest to the creating of public value (Moore, 1995) 
to take responsibility for determining the best forms of 
delivery. The budget cycle of approvals for operating 
and capital spending, monitoring and auditing creates a 
framework of incentives or barriers to effective fi nancial 
management. Too little delegation of authority can 
stifl e decentralised agencies; too much delegation of 
authority, and too little power held at the centre, can 
make it diffi cult for government to tackle large issues 
requiring coordinated effort and risk lapses in ethics and 
performance by peripheral agencies. 
The ‘what’ of government
Referee or coach? 
In deciding how to deliver public value, governments 
as legislators have a considerably wider range of options 
than do private sector corporations in their creation 
of private value. Elected representatives and offi cials 
can choose to be enablers or regulators, developers 
or conservers. After a trend towards deregulation 
during the 1980s and 1990s, when governments 
came to see themselves as largely passive referees, 
issues such as energy, transport infrastructure, climate 
change and regulation of globalised industries such as 
telecommunications require a more active ‘coaching’ 
role. Governments around the world face the dilemma 
of how much to intervene on behalf of their geography-
bound citizens in the face of mobile capital. Finding 
the appropriate balance between acting as a bystander 
referee and an activist coach is an ongoing issue about 
the desirable boundaries for governments. 
Outputs or outcomes 
Performance management and strategic planning 
instruments can have a powerful effect on the focus of 
public sector employees. Tightly-defi ned outputs can 
create focused effort within short-term horizons. The 
strategic planning and budgets that are at the core of the 
management cycle are annual reminders of the tension 
between organisational purpose and organisational 
control. Outputs and their associated performance 
measures are the primary method of control in the New 
Zealand public sector model; outcomes are declarations 
of purpose. The dilemma lies in fi nding a productive 
balance between clear and measurable outputs and 
potentially more motivating but difficult-to-assess 
outcomes.
Political responsiveness or frank advice
With their emphasis on the achievement of managerial 
results, and use of the language of clients and contractors, 
public sector reforms have heightened expectations 
by politicians for ‘responsive’ rather than ‘neutral’ 
competence (Rockman, 1998). In New Zealand, the 
pre-reform public sector model emphasised ministerial 
responsibility and public service anonymity. The 
contract-like relationships have had the effect of creating 
greater distance between political and administrative 
leadership, encouraging politicians to name and 
blame public servants for failures in delivery. Given 
employment conditions which place public service 
chief executives on fi xed contracts, how do senior public 
servants reconcile the professional expectation that they 
provide frank and fearless advice with the possibility that 
career safety might lie in minimising the frankness? 
Client or citizen?
One of the ironies of public sector reform is that 
improvements in services can result in increased demands 
for better services from clients, who may also be the 
same taxpaying citizens who are unwilling to fund the 
increasing expectations. Unlike private sector managers, 
public managers are continually challenged to balance 
the interests of clients who are usually not meeting the 
full costs of a service with the interests that citizens and 
their representatives have in tax levels, political goals and 
the fairness with which state resources are used. How 
do the ‘street level bureaucrats’ of Lipsky’s (1980) study 
experience the dilemmas created in mediating between 
the demands of citizens as clients, and the restricted 
budgets that citizens as taxpayers are willing to provide? 
Given that public organisations usually have little or 
no choice about the clients they must serve, and that 
in services such as probation or compulsory education 
the clients have no choice either, how far can private 
sector analogies work in the public sector? 
Working with dilemmas
One of the features of rhetoric for reform is the zeal 
with which arguments for change are put. The New 
Zealand reforms argued the superiority of private sector 
structures and techniques, of separating policy and delivery 
organisations, and the importance of ‘busting bureaucracies’ 
and replacing them with client-focused units performing 
with the prompting of real or potential competition. 
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Such advocacy was in the tradition of the ‘best way’ 
problem solving techniques of Frederick Taylor (1911), 
or the Boston Consulting Group matrix of the 1960s, 
which steered private sector managers towards focusing 
single-mindedly on defi nitive niches such as low cost 
or quality. Acknowledging the dilemmas inherent 
in many public services provides an antidote to ‘one 
best way’ thinking. Viewing public management as a 
series of dilemmas involves the balancing of competing 
values (Quinn, 1988) and requires skills that are 
more like those of ‘map making’ and navigating than 
problem solving. 
Dilemma management has been most fully developed 
as a technique by Hampden-Turner (1990) and 
Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (2000) to map how 
multinational corporations can more effectively work 
across national cultures. Cross-cultural management 
in multinational corporations is surprisingly relevant 
to public sector roles. Working across cultures involves 
reconciling national differences about fundamental 
values, such as communitarianism and individualism, 
or equality and hierarchy. Public managers also work 
amidst clashing values, created by politics and the 
cultures that surround very different government 
functions. Government organisations are as large as the 
largest of multinational corporations. New Zealand’s 
central government organisations employ approximately 
190,000 people,2 compared with IBM which employs 
330,000 people worldwide.3 The new governance tools 
are strongly based on techniques of large corporations, 
Positives:
Clear lines of accountability to elected 
representatives. 1960s
Lifetime vocation underpins the ethics of public 
service. 
Responsiveness to elected governments assured 
through in-house capabilities.
An independent, politically neutral 
public service.  2005?
Integrated, coordinated services. 
Positives: 1988- 99
Responsive to citizens as clients. Market-like 
methods and contracts reward good performance 
and penalise poor performance. 
Open labour market. 
Smaller, focused organisations deliver clearly 
defi ned services.
Negatives, resulting from taking this set of 
propositions too far:
Large structures become increasingly 
cumbersome and out of touch with citizen / 
clients. 
Security of employment creates an entitlement 
culture resistant to improvements in performance. 
Lack of focus in large multi-function 
bureaucracies. 1984
Negatives, resulting from taking this set of 
propositions too far:
Competition creates fragmented services, 
confusing for citizens and wasteful of resources. 
Measurable results dominate at the expense of 
equity and due process. 
Substantial costs of ‘internal regulation’ to enforce 
the accountability for performance cycle.
Public sector hierarchy Private sector / market
Late 1990s
Figure 1: Dilemmas of public management delivery 
2 Briefi ng for the minister of state services, 2005, http://www.ssc.
govt.nz/downloadable_fi les_briefi ng_for_the_minister_of_state_
services_2005.pdf, accessed 4 August 2006. 
3 January 2004 fi gures for IBM taken from The Register, an on-
line journal for the information technology industry, http://www.
theregister.co.uk/2004/01/19/ibm_to_hire/, accessed 24 August 
2005. 
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particularly the use of the ‘financial control’ style 
(Goold and Campbell, 1987), through which subsidiary 
organisations are given considerable managerial freedom 
provided they demonstrate measurable value.
The mapping of the emphasis on public and private sector 
techniques in the New Zealand public sector shown in 
Figure 1 uses the approach developed by Johnson (1996) 
to track the positives and negatives of dilemmas and map 
changes in emphasis on the polarities. 
The hierarchies of ‘old public administration’ and the 
market-like methods of ‘new public management’ 
each contain useful wisdom about the creation of 
public sector performance. The way the propositions 
have interacted in New Zealand has been a pendulum 
swing from one set of extremes to another. Johnson 
(1996) analyses the process of change as being a contest 
between crusaders and traditionalists. Change results 
from rhetoric that acts as a key to politically unlock a 
new set of doctrines, change that resembles fashions in 
consumer industries (Hood and Jackson, 1991). The 
private sector techniques adopted as solutions were in 
the late 1990s creating increasing concern about lack 
of consistency in ethics across the public sector and a 
fragmentation of services. A pendulum swing towards 
more centralised coordination has been the result, with 
the current tension being whether recentralisation will 
trigger a new cycle, or a more effective balancing of the 
best features of the two sets of propositions. The risk is 
the creation of a continuously recycling loop in which 
the grass always looks greener on the other side of the 
fence, as the positives of one set of propositions are 
contrasted with the negatives of the existing dominant 
proposition. While the map in Figure 1, derived from 
Johnson, charts the stages of response to a dilemma and 
focuses on the risks of alternating between negatives and 
positives, Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (2000) 
focus on how dilemmas might be reframed into new 
and potentially more lasting shapes. 
Managing dilemmas or solving 
problems? 
A persistent image of the role of a manager is that of a 
determined identifi er and solver of problems. Hampden-
Turner suggests that ‘the admission that dilemmas even 
exist tends to be diffi cult for some companies and 
discussions may show strain or embarrassment’. Raising 
the dilemma is to suggest the ‘absence of a perfect 
consensus’ (Hampden-Turner, 1990, p.109). 
The use of hard-edged management is a potentially 
appealing solution to the complexity, compromise 
and politics involved in many public sector challenges. 
Yet, as Downs and Larkey (1986, p.3) observe, if 
the performance of government could be solved by 
‘hard charging, tough minded business executives’, 
the problems of government would have been solved 
following the adoption of this method during the era 
of the city manager movement in the late 19th century 
in the United States. 
The English word ‘manager’ has two distinctly different 
origins (Garratt, 1987, p.103). Its macho characteristics 
relate to the 16th-century use of the Italian ‘maneggiare’, 
which meant ‘one who breaks horses’. The more 
nurturing side of management can perhaps be related 
to the derivation from the French word ‘ménager’ – the 
management of the domestic economy of a household 
or kitchen. 
Dilemma management requires an active-refl ective 
approach to management issues, one more resembling 
household management than horse-breaking. It 
is a contrast to the ‘take charge’ analytical form of 
management that seeks to reduce or ignore contradictions 
and value clashes. The acronym POSDCORB (Gulick 
and Urwick, 1937, pp.12-13) persists as a powerful 
idealisation of such managerial rationality, summarising 
the management role as planning, organising, staffi ng, 
directing, coordinating, reporting and budgeting. A role 
description of this ‘take charge’ type of manager, given 
by Schick (1996) in an analysis of the New Zealand 
public management model, only slightly exaggerates the 
expectations still placed on New Zealand departmental 
chief executives: 
They must weed out weak managers, shed 
redundant workers, re-examine or sever long-
standing relationships with suppliers, actively 
recruit from outside the Public Service, negotiate 
the wages of senior managers, revamp operations, 
abandon low-priority activities, manage their 
assets, commit in advance to output and cost 
levels, take responsibility for the volume and 
quality of services, negotiate employment, 
purchase and performance agreements, respond 
to numerous inquiries from Parliamentary 
committees and central agencies, represent 
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the department to the media and public, be 
responsive to the Minister, and more. They 
must drive the department to be more effi cient, 
productive, and responsive. They must act as if 
their own job is on the line and their own money 
is being spent.
Focusing on dilemmas acknowledges the competing 
values contained in new governance. In most public 
sector roles the lack of direct connection between 
funds and clients creates a greater set of dilemmas than 
in most private sector roles. Performance assessment 
is mediated by an ‘authorising environment’ (Moore, 
1995) of political decision making and accountability 
agencies rather than direct market-place transactions. 
Confl icting expectations for public sector performance 
are systematically captured by Hood and Jackson 
(1991), with their collection of 99 doctrines about how 
best to organise public services. For each doctrine there 
is a set of contrary propositions, and the acceptability 
of doctrines changes over time in a manner similar to 
changes in fashion for clothes or cars.
Contested views are the essence of democracy, and 
public managers operate within a context of shifting 
views about how best to tackle what Rittel and Weber 
(1973) termed ‘wicked problems’. Whereas problems 
in the natural sciences can be defi ned and separated, 
and may have solutions, many government challenges, 
particularly in the area of social policy, are ill-defi ned, 
and rely upon political judgement for resolution. 
‘Solutions’ are not an option, as social problems are 
never solved, but at best resolved over and over again. 
In his classic book The Art of Judgment, Vickers (1965, 
p.112) observed that management is fundamentally 
a skill of balancing, involving ‘constant evaluation 
and appraisal of risks, limitations, opportunities, and 
resources’. It requires integrating into one solution ‘aims 
which fi rst seem incompatible’ and a ‘rare measure of 
mental discipline’ to determine priorities for the present, 
while also dreaming about future possibilities. 
Perhaps it is no accident that the traditional road 
to major roles in the British civil service, which for 
almost a century ruled a quarter of the globe, was 
study of Greek and Latin, the ‘Greats’ as the syllabi 
for Oxford and Cambridge described them. Classical 
learning, in contrast to the analytical techniques of 
economics, accounting and statistics-based policy 
analysis, emphasised human interactions and processes, 
offering no easy once-and-for-all solutions. One of the 
recurring themes of classical education is that heroes are 
liable to overdo their winning combinations. ‘Yesterday’s 
triumph becomes tomorrow’s excess’ (Hampden-Turner, 
1990, p.74). British colonial offi cers were schooled in 
the lessons of the triumphs and failures of the Roman 
empire as preparation for their own imperial duties. 
Homer’s story of Odysseus navigating between Scylla 
and Charybdis, between the rock and the whirlpool, 
for instance, provides a dramatic analogy for the 
management of dilemmas. Navigate too close to the 
whirlpool of soft, diffi cult-to-see currents and the ship 
will be sucked to destruction. Navigate too close to the 
hard, visible features of the rock, and the ship will be 
smashed. Navigating dilemmas is the art of fi nding a 
route ‘between a rock and a hard place’. It is the process 
of fi nding one’s way through the ‘horns of a dilemma’ 
– avoiding being impaled by either horn. 
Rock-like, straight-line thinking has made a major 
contribution to public sector effi ciency during the past 20 
years. It has helped clear out the clutter of nearly a century 
of bureaucratic tradition, with its inwardly focused 
employment and performance systems. New governance 
organisations now have the accounting, human resource 
management and information technology techniques 
used by private sector organisations. The constantly 
changing, ‘whirlpool’-like issues cannot be solved but 
only managed. Acknowledging the challenges created 
by opposing propositions makes it possible to map 
possible directions, reduce complexity and seek to 
reconcile opposites. 
Conclusion
The distinctive feature of a dilemma is that there is no 
‘right answer’. Clashes of perspectives based on values 
fi t uncomfortably with formal reasoning processes, in 
which objective criteria and ratios are sought. 
Hampden-Turner (1990, p.xi) uses the term 
‘encompassing reason’ to describe a process of 
managing dilemmas. Formal reasoning is linear – the 
decision maker reasons, acts and achieves. By contrast, 
encompassing reason ‘is circular and iterative’: ‘You 
probe, discover something interesting, refl ect, cogitate, 
and probe again.’ Dealing with dilemmas is a process 
of learning, working through the processes described in 
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Kolb’s (1984) learning cycle – experiencing, refl ecting, 
conceptualising, planning and generalising. Learning 
moves from the concrete to the abstract or vice versa. 
The process of encompassing reason, with its probing of 
dilemmas, offers the possibility of combining values that 
initially may appear to clash and resist each other. 
Mapping a dilemma, as demonstrated in Figure 1, is part 
of a learning process through which seemingly opposed 
propositions can be reconciled. The visual representation 
makes explicit the opportunities for trade-offs and 
reconciliation. As Hampden-Turner puts it (1990, p.xii), 
‘like navigators, we can steer by our judgment, while 
periodically checking our position on the charts’. Living 
with and reconciling dilemmas is the essence of the art 
of public management. 
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